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FEDERAL LEGISLATION ON STATE
TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE:
Key Areas of Controversy
JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN
Professor of Law, New York University
The Background of P. L. 86-272
In 1959, Congress, for the first time in our history, enacted legislation
designed to restrict the powers of the states to tax businesses engaged in
interstate commerce. For 160 years, the Supreme Court sought to chart
out the restrictions on state taxing powers imposed by the Commerce
Clause, and the Due Process Clause, without benefit of the exercise by
Congress of its powers granted under the Constitution. Hundreds of Su-
preme Court decisions, many handed down by a sharply divided court,
delineated the limits of state taxing power in virtually every area of busi-
ness taxation-property taxes, corporate franchise, capital stock and in-
come taxes, and in more recent times, in the sales and use tax fields." The
traditional approach of the Court has been based on the conception that
under the Commerce Clause, until Congress acts, interstate businesses
must remain free to trade, unfettered by direct state taxes. This philoso-
phy created a haven for national enterprises immune from franchise,
capital stock, gross receipts and at times other taxes imposed by the states
and local governments. As has been true generally in our constitutional
law, a dynamic and growing economy, coupled with changing political
and social attitudes, reflected themselves in shifts, changes and reversals
in Supreme Court decisions charting out the permissible scope of state
taxation of interstate commerce in the silence of Congress.
Beginning in the thirties-it is not irrelevant to note that this was the
period of the great Roosevelt reform era-the majority view in the Court
began to shift to a new reading of the impact of the Commerce Clause on
state taxation. Under this view, the Commerce Clause is designed not to
free interstate businesses of state and local taxation, does not carve out an
area of immunity for the nation wide enterprise, but instead it merely
insures equality for interstate business with intrastate business, it prevents
discrimination against the out of state venture, and it debars multiple tax
burdens on interstate businesses not borne by local businesses.
1. The history is traced in Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation, Ch. 6 (2d ed.
1961) ; and Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate Income from a Multistate Busi-
ness, 13 Vand. L. R. 21 (1959).
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Two 1959 decisions-significantly, one arising in a Southern state,
Georgia, and the other in a Midwestern state, Minnesota, the regions of
the country that have been most zealous in seeking to obtain more rev.
enues from the sprawling national companies located in the heavy man.
ufacturing states-authorized the states to tax the income of an out of
state corporation doing an exclusively interstate business in the state,
where the measure of the tax was fairly apportioned, and there was ade-
quate Due Process connection with the taxing state.2 The states hailed the
decisions as marking their tax liberation; at long last they could exact tax
from the out-of-state vendors exploiting their markets, which had gone
untaxed by them theretofore. Businessmen, on the other hand, raised a
great outcry against the holdings; the decisions would Balkanize America,
they would create tax barriers to interstate trade within the nation, and
they would put an end to the long cherished tax immunity that national
businesses had enjoyed in many states. Besides, argued the accountants
and lawyers for manufacturers, wholesalers associations and mail order
houses, the envisaged broadening of state taxation of multistate businesses
would impose costly and cumbersome accounting and compliance burdens
on business, especially the smaller business selling in more than one state,
and greatly complicate enforcement of the levies by the states and local
governments. s
The Wilis Subcommittee Report
Within six months after the 1959 decisions were handed down, Congress,
acting with unusual alacrity, enacted Public Law 86-272, admittedly as
a stop gap measure; and directed a Congressional Committee to make an
overall study of how Congress should exercise its long dormant powers to
regulate interstate commerce in the state tax field. Public Law 86-272, in
essence, prohibited the states or their local subdivisions from imposing any
tax measured by net income on any non resident or foreign corporation
engaged in interstate commerce, if the activities in the taxing jurisdiction
are limited to soliciting orders for sales of tangible personal property,
where the orders are approved outside the state and the shipments filled
by delivery across state lines.
Five years later, after the most extensive study of state taxation of in.
2. Williams v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc. and Northwestern States Port-
land Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U. S. 450 (1959).
3. See Hearings Before Select Committee on Small Business of United States
Senate, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. (1959); State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, Sen.
Rep. No. 453, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. (1959); Hearings on S. J. Res. 113, S. 2213
Before the Committee on Finance of United States Senate, 86th Cong. 1st Sess.
(1959); and State Taxation of Income Derived from Interstate Commerce, Sen.
Rep. No. 658, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. (1959).
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terstate commerce in our history, conducted by a full-time staff of law-
yers, economists and statisticians, the House Judiciary Subcommittee,
headed by Congressman Edwin Willis of Louisiana, completed its report.'
This report is a gold mine of legal and economic data in the field, and just
as I understand no evening newspaper in New York could manage with-
out the New York Times, so no serious student or teacher of state and
local taxation can operate now without benefit of this report. And the re-
port and the Committee's recommendations went far beyond the contro-
versy in state taxation which gave it birth, for they deal not only with
franchise, capital stock and income taxes, but also gross receipts and sales
and use taxes.
The Willis Subcommittee proposed sweeping and far-reaching Federal
legislation designed to carry out their recommendations. A storm of pro-
test arose from virtually all quarters-the state taxing authorities, busi-
nesses and academicians. The result was that the Willis Subcommittee,
after hearings, withdrew its original bill and during the summer of 1966
substituted a considerably more modest set of proposals. 5 Although the
bills never reached a vote in the House or Senate-presumably because
of the pressure of other high priority legislation-Mr. Willis has an-
nounced that he will reintroduce the revised bill early in the next session
of Congress and press for its enactment.6
In considering the major areas of the controversy ahead, at the outset
we face the question as to whether there should be any further Con-
gressional intervention in the field. Many states are vigorous in their
opposition to Congressional intervention in the state taxation field and
not only oppose further Federal legislation, but demand the repeal of
Public Law 86-272. This is a highly unlikely result, so that the realistic
questions revolve about the kind of legislation Congress ought to enact.
We turn to the key controversies as to Federal legislation.
Net Income and Capital Stock Taxes
Beginning with state and local taxation of income or capital stock of
corporations, whether in the guise of franchise taxes or direct net income
taxes, there are two key focal points of controversy-the jurisdiction of
the states to tax the out-of-state corporation, and the allocation and ap-
portionment of the income or capital stock measures of the tax among
the states.
4. Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, H. R. Rep. 1480,
88th Cong. 2d Sess. (1964).
5. H. R. 16491, 89th Cong. 2d Sess.
6. At this writing the bill has been reintroduced into the 1967 session of Con-
gress.
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A. Jurisdiction to tax
Public Law 86-272, the Federal statute now in force, grants immunity
from state taxes measured by net income to the out-of-state vendor sell-
ing tangible personal property, if the vendor limits its activities in the
state to solicitation and shipment into the market. The maintenance of
a sales office in the state is apparently beyond the permissible minimum
standards. Likewise, a stock of goods for delivery to customers cannot be
maintained in the state-even in a public warehouse-by the out-of-state
vendor, without incurring liability to state or local taxes on income.
The big push of representatives of trade associations, Chambers of
Commerce, and others reflecting the business point of view, has been
to tighten the jurisdictional curbs on state taxation of business income
by the adoption of a "permanent establishment" rule as a jurisdictional
requirement for franchise, net income or capital stock taxes. This is the
type of test of taxation of non-resident businesses widely used in inter-
national taxation, which is embodied in tax treaties between the United
States and many other countries. But the contours of which is "per-
manent establishment" are by no means clear or readily agreed upon.
Not every regularly maintained office or place of business would neces-
sarily constitute a permanent establishment. Thus, the Financial Exe-
cutives Institute urged the Willis Subcommittee to exclude from "per-
manent establishment", sales offices and purchasing offices. The National
Association of Manufacturers sought to minimize warehousing, pur-
chasing offices and research installations by excluding such business ac-
tivities from the definition of a taxable "permanent establishment". The
Willis Subcommittee adopted a permanent establishment test of its own
as a condition to state taxation, which it calls a "business location".7 In
the original Willis bill, "business location" meant owning or leasing real
property in a state, or maintaining an employee's base of operations
there. Consequently, under this business location test, the out-of-state
vendor could exploit the local market, free of state and local taxes meas-
ured by income, only if it had neither employees nor places of business
in the state. However, this test permitted the maintenance of local stocks
of goods in the states.
In general, this approach by the Willis Subcommittee reflected, except
for the ability to stock goods without tax, what seemed on the surface to
be a fairly reasonable middle ground between the pressure of the states
to eliminate jurisdictional restrictions on their powers to tax income de-
rived from the local market and the pressure of business for greater re-
strictions on the states. However, the proposal of the Willis Subcommit-
tee to permit the out-of-state vendor to maintain a stock of goods in a
7. See Subcommittee Report, note 4 supra, at pp. 489-508.
TAX CONFERENCE
state and thereby fill its customers' orders promptly from local stocks,
such as a public warehouse, a broker's or independent salesmen's store-
house, without subjecting the vendor to tax, came as a distinct surprise
in many quarters. Traditionally, the regular maintenance of property in
a state has been an accepted basis for taxation of the out-of-state vendor,
and from an economic marketing point of view, an inventory is per-
haps the hallmark of the merchant who has localized himself in the
local market in full competition with the local merchant. The states have
bitterly protested this jurisdictional exclusion. I think we can fairly ex-
pect this proposal to be a key controversial issue in the months ahead;
and it's a little hard to see why this provision should not be deleted.
The revised version of the Willis bill make an important change that
brings its "business location" test considerably closer to the permanent
establishment test of jurisdiction to tax sought by business spokesmen
than did its original proposal. The amended bill still begins by providing
that renting or owning real estate, or having an employee in the state
will satisfy the jurisdictional test, but then it proceeds to cut the heart
out of the employee location rule by exempting the employees about
whom the controversy has raged-salesmen. Thus, a foreign corporation
could maintain a whole staff of permanent salesmen in a state and still
not be taxable, so long as the salesmen do not work out of premises
owned or rented by the out-of-state vendor. No explanation is offered in
the Committee Report as to why this significant shift favoring tax im-
munity of the out-of-state business was made. It is certain to be the
target of attack by the states.
There is another aspect of selling activities in the taxing jurisdiction
that ought to be noted. Under both the original Willis bill, as well as
the modified version, the proposed jurisdictional requirements exempt
from tax foreign corporations that market their products through sales
representatives, or other independent agents who are not employees.
Such independent contractors may maintain their own offices or business
establishments in the states, from which they solicit orders for their prin-
cipals, without subjecting their principals to tax; and these non-employee
representatives may also maintain in their warehouses stocks of their
principal's goods to meet the needs of local customers in the local
market. The difference between an employer-employee relationship and
an agent-principal relationship will often depend on legal formalities
that have little economic significance. Under this jurisdictional rule, even
if the vendor should be made taxable if he maintains salesmen-employees
in the state, we might see a large scale shifting of employee-salesmen to
so-called "agency" relationships, with the agents maintaining their prin-
cipals' former establishments in their own names. Of course, they will
in one way or another be reimbursed for such costs by the principal. It
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doesn't take much legal ingenuity to effect such a shift, and it may
mean only different forms of legal documents, without any significant
change in economic relationships. And this provision is destined not only
to increase manipulation by contract, but it will also doubtless invite
numerous controversies and litigation, in which the states will attack the
transactions as "sham", or as not achieving the independent contractor
relationship.
The volume of sales at stake in these controversies is of considerable
magnitude. The Subcommittee's report found that "more than half the
companies studied made more than 25 per cent of their sales into states
whereby they had no offices or real property of their own," and that
"'well over a quarter of the companies studied made more than 55 per
cent of their sales into such states". This is by no means "limited to the
smaller companies" for the same results obtain for companies with gross
sales of over $5 million a year." This aspect of the modified Willis bill,
extending exemption to vendors who market their goods through local
sales representatives, whether they have the status of employees or in-
dependent contractor agents, does not commend itself, in my thinking,
as an acceptable accommodation of the competing interests of the states,
interstate businesses and the local intrastate competitors.
In another respect the modified Willis bill broadens state taxing juris-
diction-the jurisdictional (as well as the apportionment and allocation)
provisions of the bill are not applicable to businesses with annual net in-
comes of over $1,000,000. This quantitative exclusion refers to the tax-
payer's income from all sources, not merely from the taxing state; it is
determined by reference to Federal net income, and is the average of the
last 5 years' results of the taxpayer and affiliated corporations-a 50%
ownership and 50% voting power relationship are the tests used for
affiliation. The Committee does not spell out the reason for this exclu-
sion, of larger enterprises from the bill, but the background is that one
of the major reasons given for the Congressional legislation was the need
to protect smaller businesses, which do not have accounting and other
staffs to advise them on the laws and administrative practices of the
states, to keep the requisite data to file returns and generally enable them
to comply with the tax laws. Moreover, the Committee had emphasized
the small amounts of state tax involved in the multi-state operations of
smaller businesses.
How have the states reacted to this exclusion of larger businesses? The
proposal is the reverse of what some state tax men have urged. Thus, it
has been suggested that the states be left with wide powers to tax and,
8. Id., p. 493. For an overall critical evaluation of the Willis Subcommittee's Re-
port, see Hellerstein, Allocation and Nexus in State Taxation of Interstate Business,
20 Tax Law Rev. 259 (1965).
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indeed, that Congress should affirmatively empower the states to impose
income, franchise or capital stock taxes on any foreign corporation or
out of state vendor which exploits the market, whether by local salesmen
or by mail order or by radio and television. However, to give relief to
smaller enterprises from burdensome accounting and compliance costs
and to eliminate state enforcements costs where the tax revenues are
minimal, Congress could prohibit the states from imposing such taxes on
out of state vendors that do not sell more than e.g. $100,000 worth of
goods a year in the taxing state, unless the business maintains a sub-
stantial location in the state, or a stock of goods there. They argue that
such a test would be much simpler and much fairer than the Willis
Subcommittee's basic approach. But if Congress is to adopt the Willis
proposal, the states now argue that $1,000,000 of net income is much too
high a cut off point; they would cut the figure sharply.
It is to be observed that the revised Willis bill would not eliminate all
Federal protection given to the larger businesses that would be included
from its terms. The proposal is that Public Law 86-272 be retained, so
as to keep the specific restrictions or state taxation of net income now in
force for all corporations.
All the jurisdictional limitations of the Willis bill under consideration
would apply equally to capital stock taxes, and as we shall see shortly,
would be carried over to sales and use tax collections.
B. Apportionment and Allocation
While it was the liberalization of state jurisdiction to tax net income
by the 1959 Supreme Court decisions that triggered the Congressional
action and resulted in Public Law 86-272, a considerable part of the
Subcommittee study and its report are devoted to apportionment and
allocation. Many businesses, and especially the great national and in-
ternational corporations, are subject to income or franchise or capital
stock taxation in all or most of the states in the Union, by any of the
jurisdictional standards being considered. A major complaint against the
existing state tax structures by such businesses has had to do with the
methods used to determine the portion of the income or capital stock
that is to be taxed by the various states. For more than half a century
the states have struggled to develop and refine methods of cutting up a
corporation's total net income or its capital employed in all states and
foreign countries, so as to determine the portion of the base to be taxed
by the particular state. 9 Formulas have been devised to determine what
portion of the total net operating or business income in attributable to a
9. This history is detailed in the Subcommittee Report, note 4 supra, pp. 129-
133.
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state; and frequently non-operating income, such as dividends, interest
and rentals have been the subject of rules as to how they should be al-
located. A favorite technique is to allocate all interest dividends to the
state of commercial domicile.
Because the Supreme Court has had no help from Congress in setting
up guide lines for resolving the claims of the various states, a wide
variety of methods of apportionment and allocation have developed and
have been approved as constitutional. The result has been a bewildering
maze of varying and conflicting rules and approaches, and it has pro-
duced undertaxation of some companies and overtaxation of others.
For example, Georgia uses a formula that apportions sales to the state of
the destination of the goods, whereas Alabama apportions them to the
location of the sales office to which the salesman who took the order is
attached. Because of these conflicting rules, if a company does all its
business in Alabama and Georgia, maintains plants and warehouses in
both states but its sales offices only in Georgia, neither state will include
the receipts from sales made to Alabama customers in making the ap-
portionment. As a consequence, the corporation would pay taxes to the
two states on less than its entire income; part of it would escape tax.
But if the sales offices were maintained in Alabama instead of Georgia,
receipts from sales made to Georgia customers would be taken into ac-
count by both states, and the corporation would be taxed on more than
100% of its income.
I have given you a very simple example. Consider the fact that 24
states apportion sales receipts, in whole or in part, to the state of destina-
tion of the goods, 7 reverse the procedure and apportion sales receipts
(in whole or in part) to the state of origin (that is the state from which
the goods are shipped), 12 states choose the locus of the sales office to
apportion sales receipts, while 8 others apportion to the place where the
sales negotiation takes place 10. No one who has struggled with the in-
tricate problems of seeking to comply with the allocation and apportion-
ment requirements of the states will, I think, dissent from the conclusion
of the Willis Report that the present system for the division of income
is characterized by diversity and complexity, requires extraordinarily
complex accounting, and results in overtaxation of some companies and
undertaxation of others.
To clean up this mess, the Willis Committee recommended that Con-
gress require the states and local governments to adopt a uniform method
of apportioning and allocating income and capital stock, if they are to
be empowered to tax manufacturers, producers, wholesalers, retailers en-
gaged in interstate commerce, and, indeed, most businesses other than
10. See the Subcommittee Report, note 4 supra, at p. 182.
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public utilities, banks, insurance companies and transportation com-
panies. The bill would also require the states to define net income in their
tax measures so as to conform generally to the definitions in the Federal
Internal Revenue Code (with some exceptions). And the bill sets out the
uniform formula and the allocation methods that state and local gov-
ernments must use.
(1) Voluntary Action by the States
There has been no great controversy over the proposal to use Federal
net income as a uniform tax base, for many states already have gone far
to conform their definitions to the Federal conception. However, a storm
of protest arose from the states against the apportionment and allocation
proposals. At the outset, the states contend that Federal legislation is not
needed to achieve uniformity in apportionment and allocation. They
point out that the states are now moving rapidly to achieve uniformity
in this area by their own legislative action. There are now some 13 or 14
states that impose taxes measured by net income that have adopted es-
sentially uniform apportionment and allocation methods by enacting the
Uniform Division of Income For Tax Purposes Act, 7 or 8 of these
adoptions have taken place within one past year or so."' Other states
are seriously considering such action for the next legislative session. As
you know, your own State Legislature has appointed a Commission,
which includes in its membership the distinguished Commissioner Morri-
set, to report a measure to the next session of the Virginia Legislature.
In addition, a strong movement has recently developed among the states
to adopt a multistate compact to deal with apportionment and alloca-
tion. The States, therefore, hold that left alone, they will do the job of
achieving uniformity of apportionment and allocation without the neces-
sity of Federal intervention.
Some people, however, are rather skeptical about relying on the
States for voluntary action in this area. Even under the threat of Fed-
eral intervention, there are still only a minority of income tax States
that have adopted the uniform apportionment and allocation of income
legislation. Moreover, the Uniform Act is severely limited in scope-a
number of types of businesses are excluded, and the formula used is ill-
adapted to such businesses as transportation, communication, radio and
television, magazine publication and a good many others that require
apportionment methods tailored to their specific operations. Besides, the
11. The Uniform Act is printed in Hearings Before the Select Committee on
Small Business of the United States, note 3 supra. For an analysis of the model act,
see Lynn, The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act Re-Examined,
46 Va. L. Rev. 1257 (1960); Pierce, The Uniform Division of Income for State
Tax Purposes, 37 Taxes 747 (1959).
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States have in some cases adopted the uniform formula with their own
special variations, and, of course, always remain free to amend their
laws so as to make further departures from the uniform act. Overall,
self regulation has not worked out very satisfactorily in our economy
generally and it seems less than adequate in this area.
(2) The Willis Bill Formula: H. R. 11798
If we are to have a Federally imposed uniform formula, the great issue
is whether Congress should adopt the formula proposed by the Willis
bill. A major feature of the Committee's recommendation is its espousal
of a two factor apportionment formula for business income-consisting
of property and payroll thereby eliminating altogether the receipts or
sales factor. The Committee found that the most serious difficulties and
complexities in apportionment, the most troublesome compliance and ac-
counting burdens arose out of the receipts factor, particularly the need to
identify the origin or destination of every shipment of goods. It also con-
cluded that it would make very little difference revenue-wise, even to
most of the non-manufacturing states, if the receipts factor were elimi-
nated altogether. Consequently, in the interest of simplicity and ease of
compliance and audit, the Willis bill proposed the two-factor formula.
The two factor formula plan has met with vigorous resistance among
the states. The three-factor formula, consisting of property, payroll and
receipts, was recommended in 1939 by a Committee of the National Tax
Association as a sound basis for apportioning business income and cap-
ital stock among the states. In the quarter of a century that has elapsed
since the N.T.A. Committee gave its imprimatur to these three factors-- ' 2
they have won virtually unanimous acceptance as proper standards for
measuring the claims of the several States to share in the income tax
base. 37 out of 38 States that use net income as a measure of their
corporate tax employ these three factors.
And the most recent development and refinement in corporate net in-
come base apportionment has been the acceptance and adoption of the
destination test for apportioning receipts from sales-at the time the
Subcommittee wrote its report, 24 out of 38 States had adopted this test
in whole or in part, and since then at least 3 other States, Idaho, New
Mexico and California, have enacted that test. In addition to protesting
the Willis Committee's abandonment what has become a national con-
sensus in favor of the three factor formula, with the destination test of
sales as the most acceptable yardstick for dividing the income tax base
of the multi-state vendor, the states argue that the elimination of the
receipts factor would short-change the agricultural and less industrialized
12. 1939 Proc. National Tax Association 190, 205.
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states and favor the heavy manufacturing states. The latter already ob-
tain a large weighting in apportioning income to their states through
the property and payroll factors. If the state where markets are ex-
ploited by out-of-state manufacturers and vendors are to be able to make
interstate businesses pay anything like their fair share of the market sales'
taxes, the formula to be used must include a receipts factor with the
factor of destination rule of apportionment. And the states entered into
a battle of statistics with the Willis Committee seeking to demonstrate
that the revenue losses to the states would be substantial and significant,
and would shift tax loads within the taxpaying group.
Finally, the states contend that the Committee's major reason for dis-
carding the receipts factor-simplification of compliance and adminis-
tration-will be accomplished by any uniform formula, and that it is not
necessary to eliminate the receipts factor with its destination test to
achieve that result.
One of the fascinating aspects of public reaction to the apportionment
provisions of the Willis bill was that business interests generally did not
rally to the Committee's suport on this score. I suspect this was as great
a surprise to the Committee as it was to the states. Spokesmen for busi-
ness have pretty generally concentrated their fire instead on the juris-
dictional provisions of the bill, not apportionment. And a good many
have been concerned with special problems that affect their own in-
dividual tax positions, such as the definition of what is a unitary business,
the treatment of dividends from subsidiaries, and the handling of income
from sources outside the United States.
Whatever the explanation, business did not rally to the support of the
two-factor formula and the states fought it. As a result; the revised
Willis bill makes what looks, on the surface at least, like a sharp retreat
from the original Willis bill's apportionment proposals.13 Instead of
exercising the Congressional power to require uniformity in apportion-
ment and allocation, the revised bill grants to taxpayers an option either
to determine the income or capital stock to be apportioned to the states,
by the application of state's apportionment and allocation methods, or
by using the two-factor formula originally proposed. The states may
keep their existing patchwork of varying and conflicting formulas, but a
business covered by the Act, may compute its tax under both the state's
regular apportionment method and under the Willis two-factor formula;
it will then pay its tax under the cheaper technique. Since the provisions
do not apply to purely intrastate businesses, or those with a five year
average Federal net incomes only over $1,000,000, the regular state
formula alone will apply to them.
13. H. R. 16491, 89th Cong. 2d Sess.
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We have thus come the full circle; a four and a half year study de.
signed to achieve as one of its major objectives uniformity in state in.
come and capital stock tax apportionment, simplification and easing of
costs and burdens of compliance and collection, winds up by proposing
that the states may retain the existing crazyquilt structure, and then
adds a new layer of complication and costs by providing an alternative
optional method of apportionment and allocation that the states must
make available to certain designated segments of interstate businesses!
Perhaps the real explanation for this apparently ironic denouement is
that its draftsmen see the proposal merely as a device to force the states
by indirection to abandon their present apportionment formulas in favor
of the two-factor formula, because of the impossible problems of living
under this hybrid proposed structure. If such is the devious purpose of
the optional formula proposed by the Willis bill, then I suggest that the
proposal ought to be rejected summarily on its merits.
For myself, I do not believe that we can effectively achieve the kind of
uniformity in apportionment and allocation that we sorely need without
Congressional intervention. And we shall need uniform methods not only
in manufacturing and selling, but also in transportation, radio and TV
and airlines and other industries which need techniques specifically
adapted to the characteristics of their businesses. My own preference is
for Congress to establish an administrative agency, empowered to pre-
scribe apportionment and allocation methods for all businesses engaged
in interstate operations, an agency that could modify its formulas in the
light of experience and issue regulations and interpretations and general-
ly administer the act.1 ' If Congress itself is to promulgate formulas, it
ought to begin by adopting the widely used three-factor formula, with a
destination test of sales and require its use by states taxing multistate
manufacturers or merchants. In this way, these enterprises will con.
tribute to the revenues of the states whose market they exploit, and they
will be put on a more nearly even basis than now obtains tax-wise vis-a-
vis local merchants. Then, after we have lived with this formula for a
few years, Congress can, in the light of our experience, consider action
as applied to other businesses, or make such changes in the formulas as
the experience dictates.
Sales and Use Taxes
The Scripto case, decided the year after Public Law 86-272 was enact-
ed, dealt with the duty of the out-of-state vendor to collect use taxes.1'
Sixteen years earlier, the Court had held that the out-of-state vendor
14. For an elaboration of this proposal, see Hellerstein, loc. cit. supra note 8.
15. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U. S. 207 (1960).
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selling through salesmen and shipping goods into a state, could con-
stitutionally be made the market state's use tax collector from the con-
sumer, even though the seller was doing an exclusively interstate business
in the state.16 In Scripto the Court upheld the state's power to compel
the seller to collect the tax when he sold through independent agents in-
stead of employees.
A great hullabaloo was voiced in business circles against this ruling.
I confess I've never quite understood why this rather easy step from the
employee-salesmen to the independent sales representative caused such
a stir, except perhaps because of the fact that an atmosphere had been
engendered by Public Law 86-272, in which business men now expected
that Congress was ready to listen sympathetically to their complaints
concerning state tax matters. There was also considerable demand for
Congressional action to curb the attempts being made by some states to
require use tax collection of mail order sales, an issue that is now pending
in the United States Supreme Court in a case in which the State of
Illinois imposed that obligation."
Sales and use taxes are of enormous importance to the states and a
local government. They have swept the country, and account for over
25% of state tax revenues; at rates of 2%-6%, they can be a significant
factor in competitive selling. For all practical purposes affecting most
articles, other than automobile purchases which can be policed through
car registrations, the taxing authorities must rely largely on the vendor
if sales and use taxes are to be effectively enforced. And if a local buyer
can cut his price by 2% or 4% or 6% by buying from an out-of-state
seller, local merchants will be at a serious competitive disadvantage. The
use tax was developed, in part at least, to protect the local merchant.
The sales and use tax proposals of the Willis Committee as set forth
in the bill it originally fathered, were, I think, a greater surprise and
shock to the states, businesses and students of the field than any other
features of the bill.
In perhaps the most sweeping restrictions on the taxing powers of the
States proposed by the entire legislation, the bill would have required
the states to adopt the major features of a national, uniform sales and
use tax prescribed by Congress, if the state was to have the power to
require collection by an out-of-state business not having a "business lo-
cation" in the State, or not regularly making household deliveries with-
in the State. An elaborate system of dual Federal and state administra-
tion was envisioned. The justification for this extensive Federal inter-
vention into the state tax field was that the burdens of sales and use
tax collections on the multistate, in determining what was taxable and
16. General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission, 322 U. S. 335 (1944).
17. National Bellas Hess, Inc., Docket No. 241.
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what was not, who was exempt from tax and who was not, and so forth,
that only a uniform act, Federally administered could deal with the is-
sues. The bill did allow the states to grant exemptions not provided for
in the so-called model tax and to adopt certain other variations, but
these were to be administered through a cumbersome refund or in.
munity registration number system.
These proposals were met in all sectors with bewilderment and dis-
may-state tax administrators and business interests alike. Let me
quickly dispose of these legislative aberrations by informing you that the
whole elaborate scheme was quietly interred by the revised Willis bill.
Instead, the revised Willis bill would restrict the state's power to require
the out-of-state vendor to collect sales and use taxes generally to tax-
payers that have a business location in the state. Since the same defini-
tion for "business location" is proposed for the sales and use tax pro-
visions, as is used in the income and capital stock sections, they would
substantially cut down on collections now being made by vendors who
send travelling salesmen into a state, or who sell through independent
contractors, or who maintain staffs of their own salesmen in a state
without sales offices. And, of course, the revised bill would halt the at-
tempts of the states to force collections of tax on mail order sales. I
should note that the bill does permit the states to require collection of the
use tax where the vendor makes regular household deliveries of goods in
the state.
This issue of the duty of the out-of-state merchant to collect sales and
use taxes is the focal point of the sales and use tax controversy that lies
ahead over the revised Willis bill. To be sure, there are other important
provisions in the bill; there is provision prohibiting the imposition of
sales or use taxes in the case of interstate sales by any state other than
the state where delivery of the goods takes place. There is a use tax
credit requirement, so that where more than one state imposes tax, only
one tax will be finally imposed. There is an exemption from tax for
household goods, and automobiles brought into a state by a person mov-
ing into the state, where he acquired the goods while residing in another
state. And there is a provision permitting the seller to rely on resale
certificates of registered buyers as establishing non-taxability on a trans-
action. These proposals are not likely to cause much controversy. Such
provisions are already in force in the laws of many states, and in general
state tax administrators are not unsympathetic to them.
The real fight will come over the provisions in the bill designed to cur-
tail the obligation of the out-of-stater to collect sales or use taxes. The
tax administrators regard these proposals as a serious threat to their
revenues, and as putting their local people at an unfair and significant
competitive disadvantage. Moreover, there appears to be a growing vol-
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ume in the mail order business, which some economists regard as a
threat to customary local retailing, that is hurt by the use tax differential.
The major argument made by businesses is that it is too costly and too
time consuming to master the tax laws of the states-and the hundreds of
local, city, county and other tax laws-and that the burden of collecting
taxes is far too onerous. Perhaps uniformity of sales and use tax collec-
tion rules within a single state might be required to eliminate local dif-
ferences, something that the revised Willis bill requires. And, conceivably,
the legislation might draw a line between those taxpayers that have
officers or salesmen or independent sales representatives in a state, who
can presumably familiarize themselves with the local law, requiring them
to collect tax, and those who sell by traveling salesmen or mail order or
by phone, who would not be required to collect the tax. Overall, how-
ever, I have the feeling that we are not ready for Federal legislation deal-
ing with State sales and use tax collections by out of state vendors. We
have been studying apportionment and allocation problems in the in-
come and capital stock areas for decades. The main body of factual data
collected by the Willis Committee staff related to those taxes. We are
pretty much in the dark as to the dimensions of the sales and use tax
problems, the costs and the competitive effects of avoiding collections
and other factors; these were not the subject of extensive inquiry by the
Committee. So serious a step as curbing the state's powers to require
businesses to collect taxes from local consumers, which may give one
segment or another in our economy a highly important advantage, ought
not, I suggest be taken until we have a pretty firm factual basis for what
we are doing. This legislation can await another day.

